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Abstract: We examine the inter-relationships among employee-friendly policies (EFP), innovation
through R&D investment, and firm value. We hypothesize that firms with higher levels of
innovation and entrepreneurial spirit are more likely to utilize EFP. Furthermore, we speculate that
the value-EFP association is more pronounced in firms with high R&D intensity. Consistent with
these assertions, we find that EFP is significantly and positively related to R&D investment and the
number of patents. EFP is also associated with increased firm value at high levels of R&D
investment and high numbers of patents. Furthermore, we find that firms investing more in R&D
are more likely to treat their workers favorably and that markets react positively when such firms
are recognized for their favorable treatment of employees. Our analysis, based on a large sample of
U.S.-based firms and two different measures of employee-friendly policies, supports the assertion
that EFP based on sustainable innovation and entrepreneurial mindsets contributes to value creation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
While employee-friendly practices provide an obvious social benefit, the question of their
relationship to corporate financial performance is still of significant interest to finance scholars.
For example, were employee-friendly practices found to contribute to the creation of value, rather
than simply to further social goals, that would provide an economic justification for firms’
investment in the well-being of their employees (Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011; Edmans, 2011;
Kang and Kim, 2020). Although employees’ human capital is central to firm financial success
(Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 1999, Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Kovacs, Carnabuci, and Wezel
(2021), the question of a direct relationship between employee-friendly practices and corporate
financial performance remains a hotly debated issue (Kruger, 2015; Riley, Michael, and Mahony,
2017).
Human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Riley, Michael, and Mahony, 2017; Acabbi, 2020)
posits that investments in employees will often generate positive economic value because they
benefit the knowledge and skills of these employees, thereby improving employee productivity.
Existing research supports the assertion that such investments lead to superior financial
performance, especially when the human capital is firm-specific and accumulated human capital
(Riley, Michael, and Mahony, 2017; Acabbi, 2020). Further, the resource-based approach suggests
that firms are willing to make investments in firm-specific human capital. Because these intangible
investments' tacit and multifaceted nature makes imitability difficult (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982),
empirical research finds firm-specific human capital's importance (e.g., Hatch and Dyer, 2004).
Human capital investments are often considered significant complements to knowledge gained
through R&D, as employees may need to skillfully interact with advanced technology and
operation for company success and for maintaining entrepreneurial spirit (Kor, 2006; Riley et al.,
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2017; Acabbi, 2020).
Still relatively unexplored is the link between firm-specific human capital investment and
employee-friendly practices, without which highly skilled but unhappy employees may be more
likely to leave their jobs, preventing firms from realizing returns on their investment. Moreover,
the argument linking employee-friendly policies to increased firm value and improved
productivity may be spurious: it is possible that high-performing firms simply have sufficient
slack resources to invest in employee-friendly policies, whereas firms with relatively weaker
financial records lack such resources, so that the causal relationship actually stems from
performance to employee-friendly policies. Alternatively, underperforming managers may treat
workers better in an attempt to gain support and legitimacy (e.g., through labor union) to forestall
problematic relationships (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009); in this case, poor
performance might spur, rather than result from, the implementation of employee-friendly
policies. More investigation into the directionality of this relationship is therefore merited.
This paper addresses these gaps by investigating the link between employee-friendly
practices, entrepreneurial innovation spurred by research and development (R&D), and firm value.
More specifically, we predict a positive relationship between firm-specific innovation through
R&D investment and the likelihood of adopting employee-friendly practices, as well as a positive
effect between this relationship and firm value creation. These questions generate insight into the
process by which innovative firms might strategically initiate worker-friendly corporate
atmospheres. Concomitantly, we expect firms that depend on human capital to spur innovation
will generate more value from adopting employee-friendly practices than those less dependent on
innovative and entrepreneurial spirit.
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Incorporating R&D investment into the study of the links between employee-friendly
policies and firm value also allows us to mitigate, at least partially, the causality problem. We
draw on the innovation literature (e.g., Griliches, 1979, 1981; Hall, 1993, Eberhart, Maxwell, and
Siddique, 2004) and the stakeholder theory-based value creation literature (e.g., Donaldson and
Preston (1995) for a review of stakeholder theory) to identify employee-friendly policies as a
critical element of firm value creation. If financial performance determined investment in
employee-friendly policies, we would observe a positive correlation between them, independent of
R&D intensity. Similarly, if employee-friendly policies precede improved firm performance, we
would observe a stronger correlation between them among high R&D intensity firms than among
low R&D intensity firms. Therefore, we posit that R&D investment is critical to explaining
differences in the relationship between employee-friendly policies and firm value implementation.
Consistent with the value creation theory, we find that firms that invest more in R&D engage
more in employee-friendly initiatives and activities than firms with lower R&D investments.
Furthermore, we find that the relationship between employee-friendly practices and firm value is
positive for high-R&D firms but not for low-R&D firms. These results indicate that R&D
investment encourages firms to invest more in employee-friendly practices and provide evidence
that the causation runs from employee treatment to firm performance. Our results remain
consistent when we control for corporate governance. Based on Fortune’s “100 Best Companies
to Work For” list as an alternative measure of employee friendliness, we find that firms with
higher R&D expenditures are more likely to be included in the Fortune list, which leads investors
to view innovation efforts more positively. In contrast to Chang and Jo’s (2019) finding that
product market competition incentivizes firms to treat their employees well, we argue that R&D
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investment induces firms to invest in employee-friendly initiatives in the hopes of achieving
competitive advantage through sustainable innovation and entrepreneurial mindset.
Our study contributes to the literature within several distinct domains. First, we find that
R&D investment is an essential factor that motivates firms to improve employee-friendly
practices. Employees are one of the most significant stakeholders of a company, and investments
in programs that benefit employees are seen as value-adding activities. Our findings provide
empirical evidence for the value creation theory and, to a certain extent, for the stakeholder theory
of the firm. Second, with the help of R&D investment, this research sheds light on conflicting
findings reported in the literature by mitigating the causality issue, at least partially, between labor
policies and firm value. Third, it enhances our understanding of the importance of human capital
in modern corporations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The literature on employee-friendly practices
and R&D investment is reviewed and our hypotheses are developed in Section 2. Data and
research methodology are discussed in Section 3. Descriptive statistics and multivariate results are
reported in Section 4. The conclusion is presented in Section 5.

2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Many firms invest in programs that benefit employees beyond basic compensation and
benefits packages. For example, employee-friendly initiatives may include profit-sharing plans,
bereavement leave, help to offset the cost of elder care, and the provision of health insurance to
cover unmarried domestic partners. Firms implement employee-friendly initiatives because they
can improve employee productivity (e.g., Huselid, 1995) and enhance the quality of work-life in a
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company’s plants, work life innovations, and the use of cooperative labor-management teams
(Katz et al., 1987; Michael, and Mahony, 2017).
Nevertheless, the benefit of employee-friendly practices on corporate financial
performance is a hotly debated topic between scholars in two theoretical camps: value creation
theory and agency theory. Under the value creation theory, human capital is a critical
organizational asset, and employees are one of the most important stakeholders to a firm’s
competitiveness and success (Pfeffer, 1994; Zingales, 2000).1 We consider that higher R&D
investment might motivate managers to promote innovation and firm productivity by enacting
employee-friendly practices. Proponents of this theory believe that employee-friendly programs
improve a firm’s ability to recruit, retain, and motivate its employees (Edmans, 2011). These
programs also attract socially responsible consumers and improve a firm’s overall reputation. The
value creation theory thus predicts that employee-friendly practices will positively affect expected
future financial performance and increase shareholder wealth. In support of this theory, many
studies have documented evidence of a relationship between employee-friendly company
initiatives and favorable financial performance (e.g., Bae et al., 2011; Edmans, 2011; Ertugrul,
2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Kang and Kim, 2020).
According to the value creation theory, human capital is a critical organizational asset, and
employees are among the primary sources of ability to compete and succeed (Pfeffer, 1994;
Wright & McMahan, 1992; Zingales, 2000). Higher R&D investment might motivate managers
with an entrepreneurial mindset to enact employee-friendly policies to promote innovation and
firm productivity. Such initiatives improve a firm’s ability to recruit, motivate, and retain

1

Pfeffer (1994) contends that creating a high-performance work force is crucial in competitive industries, because
traditional sources of competitive advantage such as production technology, access to capital, and economies of scale
have become increasingly available to all firms.
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employees and enhance firm reputation. Consistent with the value creation theory, employeefriendly practices are associated with increased financial performance and shareholder wealth.
Extant research supports the assertion that employee-friendly practices are associated with
improved firm financial performance consistent with this account (e.g., Bae et al., 2011; Edmans,
2011; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye & Trahan, 2011; Kang & Kim, 2020).
Friedman (1970), in contrast, argues that the primary corporate goal is to generate profits.
Since employee-friendly initiatives shift value away from shareholders, they negatively impact
long-term firm financial performance. The principal-agent theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)
similarly asserts that managers may overinvest in employees to build their managerial reputations,
a private benefit that shifts value away from shareholders. Cronqvist et al. (2009) likewise
document that managers may overpay labor to gain private benefits including less adversarial
wage negotiations and better social relationships with employees. Faleye et al.’s (2006) finding
that labor-controlled firms produce lower labor productivity – and overall productivity – suggests
that employee ownership does not necessarily align employee and shareholder interests.
Furthermore, Atanassov and Kim (2009) find that firms, where management and workers are
strongly aligned, are less likely to fire employees or managers, even when firm financial
performance suffers. In sum, according to agency theory, employee-friendly initiatives are likely
to compromise firm performance and shareholder wealth.

2.1 Employee-Friendly Practices and Firm Performance
A number of studies have examined the relationship between companies’ employeefriendly initiatives and certain financial variables. Filbeck and Preece (2003) find that firms named
to the Fortune list of “Best 100 Companies to Work For” have positive abnormal returns at the
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announcement. Faleye and Trahan (2011) find that stock markets respond positively to
announcements of labor-friendly policies and that labor-friendly firms have superior performance
in long-run stock returns and operating results. Along the same lines, Edmans (2011) finds that
employee satisfaction causes more robust corporate performance through improved recruitment,
retention, and motivation. Further, Ertugrul (2013) examines whether employee-friendly practices
of an acquiring firm affect acquisition performance and find a positive relationship between
employee-friendly practices of the acquirer and long-term post-acquisition performance.
Extending this research to firm risk tolerance, Bae, Kang, and Wang (2011) find that firms with a
higher score on the Employee Treatment Index (i.e., firms that adopt more employee-friendly
policies) maintain lower leverage.
The question that arises in light of these extensive findings is why managers fail to
consider the positive impact that employee-friendly programs have on firm performance? In a
study focused on the positive link between job satisfaction and firm value as determined by the
stock market, Edmans (2011) found that although employee satisfaction is linked to improved
corporate performance, the stock market does not immediately register the value of employee
satisfaction. He points out that since managers are evaluated on short-term performance results,
they do not invest in employee-friendly practices that enhance job satisfaction because such
investments have no payoff in the short term.
In contrast, we can ask why, if employee-friendly practices are not generally motivated by
firm performance, are any managers motivated to adopt them? What is missing from this
calculation that previous studies have overlooked? As noted earlier, previous research has
demonstrated that innovation and entrepreneurial incentives influence corporate decision-making
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through R&D investment. Thus, we speculate that firms are motivated to implement employee
welfare policies because such investments enhance firm innovative and entrepreneurial mindset.

2.2 Employee-Friendly Practices and R&D Investment
We believe that the real value of investment in employee-friendly practices is inexorably
tied to the need for innovation based on R&D. High R&D intensity is often taken as an indication
of the importance of knowledge and technology in a firm or industry (Helfat, 1994). R&D is also
considered a form of investment in “technical” capital that results in knowledge enhancement,
leading to product and process innovation. Firms can gain significant and enduring competitive
advantage and other lasting benefits through R&D investment (Griliches, 1979; Gu, 2016; Liao
and Lin, 2017). Gu (2016) has suggested that R&D-intensive firms tend to be riskier and earn
higher expected returns than R&D-weak firms, particularly in competitive industries, though
neglecting the relationship between R&D intensity and employee-friendly practices.
Recent studies have provided evidence that employee-friendly practices influence
corporate innovation performance through patents. For example, Chen, Chen, Hsu, and Podolski
(2016) show that firms with better employee treatment policies generate more and better patents
by improving employee satisfaction and teamwork. Similarly, Chen, Leung, and Evans (2016)
suggest that firms with employee-friendly workplaces achieve greater innovative success. Chang,
Fu, Low, and Zhang (2015) further find that monetary incentives such as stock option plans for
lower-level employees foster innovation.
Unlike the literature of employee treatment causing innovation and patents, our intuition
focuses on the reverse-causal side of innovation causing employee-friendly practices. Specifically,
R&D-intensive firms depend on highly skilled employees because of the technical expertise

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

Chang et al.: Employee-Friendly Practices and Innovation

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 7

required to acquire the firm-specific – potentially immense but quite uncertain – payoffs
associated with R&D investment. Therefore, high R&D firms must invest in human capital to
maintain and improve their innovative capacity and entrepreneurial spirit. Thus, we claim that they
have strong incentives to treat employees well through practices like encouraging employee
involvement in decision making, providing human capital development through training and
development programs, and resolving various employee “controversy” concerns. Moreover, these
types of human capital investments provide complements to knowledge gained through R&D,
enabling employees at all levels to interact skillfully with advanced technology and conduct
advanced operating procedures (Kor, 2006; Kor & Mahoney, 2005; Riley et al., 2017).
Investment in employee-friendly practices, therefore, is increasingly pivotal in a firm with
high R&D intensity. Effective human capital investments, which enhance employees’ knowledge
and skills, increase the likelihood of choosing higher-margin R&D projects from a portfolio,
raising the possibility of creating sustainable competitive advantage (Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Kor,
2006; Kor & Mahoney, 2005; Riley et al., 2017). This sustainable innovation hypothesis thus
predicts that firms with higher R&D intensity invest more in employee-friendly practices. In
contrast, firms that invest heavily in R&D are high-growth firms with relatively low free cash
flows and internal reserves. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory argues that these firms have
fewer resources to invest in employee benefits wastefully. So, firms with higher R&D intensity are
less likely to invest in employee-friendly practices. Based on the above arguments, we suggest the
following:
H1: Firms with higher levels of R&D investment are more likely to utilize employeefriendly policies.

2.3 Employee-Friendly Practices, R&D Investments, and Firm Value
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R&D-driven innovation benefits firms by generating barriers to entry that allow them to
achieve economies of scale or product differentiation (Porter, 1979), thus generating sustainable
competitive advantage. Following the seminal work by Griliches (1981), several papers have
examined ﬁrms’ productivity from R&D investments to demonstrate the positive relationship
between R&D investments and firm value (e.g., Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Jaffe, 1986).
Recent studies have similarly attempted to link employee-friendly practices to long-term
competitive advantage and firm value as well (e.g., Edmans, 2011; Ertugrul, 2013; Edmans, Li,
and Zhang, 2017). However, observers note that the advantages of employee-friendly programs
are often ignored (e.g., Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999). This is at least in part because financial markets
fail to register their value, as employee-friendly practices are intangible and cannot be physically
observed or easily measured, and their benefits take as long as four to five years to become
apparent (Edmans, 2011).
Nevertheless, Kruger (2015) finds that markets react negatively to negative news related to
employee-friendly practices, suggesting that markets recognize the value of treating employees
well. To the extent that R&D investment determines the degree of employee-friendly practices, it
is likely that the two together should also impact firm value. The value creation theory points to
the importance of human capital as an organizational asset. According to the sustainable
innovation hypothesis, R&D investment incentivizes firms to invest in more employee-friendly
practices. Together, firms may be able to generate value through sustainable innovation and
subsequent increases in competitiveness.
If high R&D firms keep poor employee-friendly practices, they become less innovative
and consequently are valued less. However, poor employee-friendly practices are less damaging
for low R&D firms, in terms of firm value. This is because, in those organizations, value creation
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through human capital is not as critical as in high R&D firms. In contrast, agency theory predicts
that an over-investment in employee-friendly practices might be a waste and detrimental to
shareholder value in those firms (Friedman, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pagano & Volpin,
2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Masulis and Reza, 2015). Thus, we postulate:
H2: The positive firm value-employee-friendly policies association is more
pronounced in firms with high R&D intensity than firms with low R&D intensity.
3. DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data and Measurement of Employee-Friendly Practices
We used the MSCI Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Stats database from 1991 to
2013 to build our sample. After eliminating observations with incomplete data in Compustat and
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), we eliminated all firms in highly regulated
industries like utilities and finance, giving us a final sample of 3,590 firms and 22,005 firm-year.
The KLD database has been used to measure employee-friendly policies in several ways (e.g., Bae
et al., 2011; Faleye & Trahan, 2011; Landier et al., 2009; Verwijmeren & Derwall, 2010); we
follow Verwijmeren and Derwall’s (2010) protocol.
KLD gives each company a rating on each of seven strengths and five concerns in its
employee relations ratings. Specifically, the strength ratings are based on: the quality of a
company’s union relations, cash profit sharing, employee involvement in decision making or stock
ownership, human capital development by training and development programs, retirement
benefits, a healthy and safe workplace, and “other” strengths. The concerns ratings are based on:
having notably poor union relations, willful violations of employee health and safety standards,
significant reductions in the company’s workforce in recent years, having an inadequate retirement
benefits program, and other employee “controversy” concerns, which generally consist of human

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol24/iss2/7
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol24/iss2/7
DOI:
10.57229/2373-1761.1417

155

156

rights violations pertaining to employees. The KLD ratings consist of a 0/1 value assigned to each
strength and each concern factor. An employee friendliness index (EFI) is constructed by
summing these ratings, with negative weight for weakness categories. A higher EFI indicates
better employee-friendly practices.
Consistent with earlier studies (Verwijmeren & Derwall, 2010; Kang & Kim, 2020), we
leave out workforce reductions from our analysis because they are negatively correlated to other
categories of employee concerns. Our results remain similar if we include the workforce
reductions category.

3.2 Research Methodology
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with pooled observations across
both firms and time to test our hypotheses. In particular, we regress EFI on R&D, measured by
R&D expenditure normalized by total assets to examine H1 of the relationship between employeefriendly policies and R&D intensity. We estimate the following equation to test our predictions:
EFIit = β0 + β1 R&Dit + γ Xit + λt + εit,

(1)

where R&Dit is R&D intensity, measured by R&D expenditure normalized by total assets. Xit is a
vector of time-variant firm-specific control variables known to be important in the literature. λt is
year dummy and εit is the error term. Following Landier et al. (2009) and Faleye and Trahan
(2011), our control variables include financial leverage, capital expenditure, sales growth,
profitability (return on assets [ROA]), stock return volatility, firm age, and firm size. Leverage is
long-term debt divided by total assets. ROA is defined as earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets. Capital expenditure is
normalized by total assets. Sales growth is computed as a geometric mean of change in sales over
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year t-3 to t. Return volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock return during the year. Firm
age is the number of years listed in CRSP. We also control product market competition following
Gu (2016) and Chang and Jo (2019), measured by the Herfindahl-Herschman index (HHI).2 All
financial variables are measured at fiscal year-end. A summary of variable definitions is provided
in the Appendix. The prediction of β1 > 0, which is consistent with the sustainable innovation
theory, captures the idea that firms treat their employees better to maintain competitive advantage
in high R&D firms. If β1 is negative, the result supports the free cash flow theory prediction that
managers are forced to commit fewer resources to employee-friendly programs when faced with
higher R&D investment.
To test the effects of employee-friendly practices and R&D investment on firm value
(Tobin’s q), we estimate the following equation:
Tobin’s qit = β0 + β1 EFIit + β2 D(High R&D)it + β3 EFIit * D(High R&D) + γ Xit + λt + εit ,

(2)

where D(High R&D) is a dummy variable indicating R&D higher than the sample median. Xit is a
vector of time-variant firm-specific control variables, including financial leverage, capital
expenditure, sales growth, ROA, product market competition, return volatility, firm age, and firm
size. λt is year dummy and εit is the error term. Tobin’s q is measured by the market value of equity
plus book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets, obtained from Compustat. The
prediction of β3 > 0 is consistent with the value creation theory, which implies that firms investing
more in R&D become more innovative and create additional value through more investments in
employee-friendly practices, resulting in higher firm value. Conversely, the prediction of β3 < 0 is
consistent with the agency theory, which implies that engaging more in employee-friendly policies
leads to a lower firm value, when R&D investment is high.

HHI is computed as the sum of squared market shares, using firms’ sales from Compustat within the two-digit SIC
code. Note that the higher the HHI index, the higher the concentration (i.e., the lower the competition).
2
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To provide additional evidence on the value creation theory, we perform an event study
using the list of Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For.” We examine the market reaction to
the inclusion in the Fortune list to test whether investors value employee-friendly policies
positively, especially for R&D intensive firms. This event study also provides a test of the causal
relationship between employee relations and firm value. First, abnormal stock returns at the
inclusion announcement are estimated using the market model method described in Brown and
Warner (1985). Finding a positive mean abnormal return would be supportive of the view that
employee-friendly practices increase shareholder value. Then we estimate the following crosssectional regression:
ARit = β0 + β1 R&Dit + γ Xit + εit ,

(3)

where ARit is abnormal return. Xit is a vector of control variables. The prediction of β1 > 0 is
consistent with the premise that higher R&D intensity creates more value in employee-friendly
firms.

4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation
In Table 1, we present the summary statistics for our sample of 22,005 firm-year
observations. We first report the main variables, employee friendliness index (EFI) and R&D
intensity (R&D), and then show control variables obtained from Compustat and CRSP. EFI has a
mean of -0.030 and a median of 0.000. Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) report similar mean and
median of -0.197 and 0.000, respectively, for their KLD sample from 2001 to 2005. The average
of R&D is 4.4% of total assets with a median of 0.5%. The mean values of leverage and ROA are
0.190 and 0.118, respectively. Sample firms also display an average Tobin’s q of 2.146. Capital
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expenditure averages 5.7% of total assets. Sales growth rate has large outliers and is thus
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Mean sales growth is 12.1% over the prior three years.
Mean return volatility is 0.029 and sample firm age is, on average, 22.21 years. Finally, mean firm
size is $7,348 million in terms of total assets (adjusted to 2013 constant dollars). Note that the
number of observations is reduced to 21,333 for Tobin’s q because of missing values in Compustat.
The above sample characteristics are comparable to those documented in previous studies, such as
Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) and Bae et al. (2011).
[Table 1 about here]
Table 2 presents the Spearman correlation matrix for our variables. Consistent with our
prediction of a positive association between employee-friendly practices and degree of R&D
intensity, EFI is positively related to R&D, suggesting that the higher the R&D investment level,
the higher the level of employee-friendly practices. The correlation coefficient of 0.054 is
significant at the 1% level. Next, as expected, Tobin’s q is positively related to both EFI and
R&D, suggesting firm value is higher with better employee-friendly practices and higher R&D
intensity. The correlation coefficients are 0.083 and 0.295 (both significant at the 1% level),
respectively.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 reports our findings on EFI by R&D investment. The sample is partitioned by
R&D. The high R&D subsample contains firms with R&D greater than the median, and the low
R&D subsample contains firms with R&D less than and equal to the median. The evidence
indicates that employees are treated better in high R&D firms. The mean estimates of EFI are
higher for the high R&D group (0.096) than for the low R&D counterpart (-0.155), and the mean
difference test is highly significant (t-value = 19.81). This result is robust to possible deviations
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from nonnormality; the nonparametric Wilcoxon test is also highly significant (p-value = 0.000).
The univariate results again support our hypothesis that employee-friendly practices are positively
correlated with R&D investment. The evidence is consistent with the sustainable innovation
hypothesis, H1.
[Table 3 about here]

4.2 Regression Results of Employee-Friendly Practices
We employ OLS regressions with year dummies to account for time-independent effects
for each variable that might be correlated with the regressors.3 The p-values of coefficients are
computed based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level. Table
4 presents results from the baseline regression of the level of employee-friendly practices on the
level of R&D investment with control variables. In model (1), we find that the impact of R&D on
EFI is positive and significant with a p-value of 0.000, supporting H1.
In model (2), we include control variables. The results are similar to those in model (1).
Our point estimate of R&D is positive and significant, suggesting that the level of employeefriendly practices increases as firms become more R&D intensive.4 This evidence confirms our
univariate results reported in Table 3 that the mean EFI is higher for high R&D firms than low
R&D firms.
In model (3), we additionally control for capital expenditure and sales growth, and obtain
results similar to those in model (2). The results on the control variables are mostly consistent with
the findings in earlier studies. The leverage coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level,

3

We control only the year fixed effects, as industry control would be perfectly correlated with the HHI.

4

Our results remain intact when we measure lagged R&D investment in the regressions.
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suggesting that firms with a high debt ratio tend to shun employee-friendly policies. Our finding is
consistent with Verwijmeren and Derwll (2010) and Bae et al. (2011), which report a negative
relationship between employee-friendly practices and financial leverage. We also find that
companies in more competitive industries are more likely to implement employee-friendly
practices, supporting Chang and Jo (2019), which stems from the need for a competitive edge.
Because human capital is vital in these firms for a competitive advantage, they are likely to invest
more in employee-friendly policies. In addition, firms that are more profitable and larger tend to
treat their employees better. Overall, our evidence supports the sustainable innovation hypothesis,
H1.
[Table 4 about here]

4.3 Regression Results of Firm Value
Table 5 examines the effects of employee-friendly practices and R&D investment on firm
value, measured by Tobin’s q. We again employ pooled regressions with year dummies. In model
(1), we first test the influence of employee friendliness on firm value with control variables. We
find a positive and significant association between EFI and Tobin’s q (p-value = 0.000),
suggesting that firm value is positively related to employee-friendly practices. The results are
consistent with Edmans (2011) and Faleye and Trahan (2011).
Next, we add R&D investment in model (2). We use the dummy variable D(High R&D),
indicating R&D greater than the sample median, and find that R&D investment is positively and
significantly correlated with Tobin’s q (p-value = 0.000). The finding suggests that R&D
investment enhances firm value (see, e.g., Eberhart et al. 2004: Gu 2016). Furthermore, the
coefficient on EFI remains positive and significant.
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In model (3), we add the interaction variable EFI * D(High R&D) to test the joint effect of
employee treatment and R&D intensity on firm value. We find that the coefficient on the
interaction variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that Tobin’s q increases
with the level of employee-friendly practices when R&D intensity is high. The coefficient on
D(High R&D) remains positive and significant, but the coefficient on EFI is no longer significant.
The results suggest that the positive association between EFI and Tobin’s q in models (1) and (2)
is primarily driven by firms with high R&D investments. Tobin’s q is not associated with EFI for
firms with low R&D investment. Firm value thus increases with the level of employee-friendly
practices mainly from high R&D intensity firms, supporting the value creation hypothesis, H2.
Furthermore, we find no significant relationship between employee-friendly practices and
firm value among low R&D firms, providing evidence against reverse causality. If the direction of
causation went from firm performance to employee-friendly practices, a positive correlation
between them should have been found regardless of R&D investment. The results for the control
variables are similar to those in previous studies and show that Tobin’s q is higher when firms
grow faster, but lower when firms have higher leverage and are more matured and larger.
[Table 5 about here]
Padgett and Galan (2010) find that R&D intensity is positively associated with corporate
social responsibility (CSR), where employee relations are one of its components. Therefore, it is
plausible that EFI proxies for CSR in our firm value regressions, so we control for CSR in model
(4) to discern the EFI effect. The variable ‘CSR less EFI’ is constructed by adding strength and
concern factors (negative weight for concerns) for each KLD category other than employee
relations and then summing the scores across different categories.5 Even after controlling for other

5

Other KLD categories include community, corporate governance, diversity, environment, human rights, and product.
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CSR components, our results are almost identical to those reported in model (3). In particular, the
interaction variable EFI*D(High R&D) is positive and significant. At the same time, EFI remains
insignificant, suggesting that employee-friendly policies are associated with a higher value in high
R&D intensive firms, reinforcing our value creation hypothesis, H2. We also note that CSR less
EFI is positively related to the firm value, consistent with the findings of earlier studies (Ferrell,
Liang, and Renneboog, 2016; Flammer, 2015; Jiao, 2010).

4.4 Robustness Check: Controlling for Corporate Governance
Prior studies document that R&D investment and corporate governance are interrelated.
For example, O’Connor and Rafferty (2012) find that firms with stronger governance invest more
in R&D, while Jo and Harjoto (2012) find that corporate governance influences CSR activity,
including employee-friendly practices. In addition, Almeida, Hsu, Li, and Tseng (2021) suggest
that, without appropriate corporate governance, a cash windfall may lead managers to engage in
riskier innovation strategies, which can destroy value. We, therefore, control for governance
mechanisms in both employee-friendly practices and firm value regressions.
We gathered data on board characteristics and governance quality - independent board,
board size, G-index, and E-index – from RiskMetrics for each sample firm. Independent board is a
dummy variable indicating that the proportion of independent outsider to total board members is
greater than 50%. Board size represents a count of board members. The G-index is the governance
quality index from Gompers et al. (2003), constructed by adding one index point for each of the 24
anti-governance provisions listed in Gompers et al. (2003). The E-index is the entrenchment index
from Bebchuk et al. (2009), an index of the six anti-takeover provisions listed in Bebchuk et al.
(2009). Higher index values imply weaker governance. Note that the RiskMetrics “Directors” file
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that contains director information only goes back to 1996, whereas the “Legacy” file that contains
G-index and E-index information goes back to 1990 but stops in 2006. Accordingly, our sample
size is reduced to 11,148 firm-year observations to include board characteristics and further
reduced to 7,013 to include governance index variables.
Table 6 presents results from OLS regressions of the level of EFI on the level of R&D
investment with internal governance variables including independent board, board size, G-index,
and E-index. In model (1), we add the dummy variable D(Independent board) and Board size
with the same control variables used in Table 4. Similar to the results reported in Table 4, we find
that the impact of R&D on EFI is positive and significant at the 1% level. In addition, we find that
the coefficient on D(Independent board) is positive and significant at the 5% level, but the
coefficient on Board size is insignificant. Interestingly, our finding of a positive effect of
independent board on employee-friendly practices contrasts with Landier et al.’s (2009) finding
that firms with stronger governance via the presence of a large outside blockhloder invest less in
employee-friendly practices.
In model (2), we add G-index to model (1). Although the coefficients on R&D and
D(Independent board) remain positive and significant, the coefficient on G-index is insignificant.
These results do not change when we replace G-index with E-index in model (3). The results on
the other control variables are largely unaffected with the addition of the governance variables.
Again, although our study supports the view that R&D investment influences a firm’s investments
in its employees, our study also provides limited support for the view that the amount a firm
invests in employee-friendly initiatives, at least partially, depends on the resources it has, as
evidenced by the positive coefficients on both profitability and firm size measures.
[Table 6 about here]
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Next, we examine the joint effect of R&D investment and employee-friendly practices on
firm value, while controlling for governance mechanisms that include independent board, board
size, G-index and E-index. In model (1) of Table 7, we add D(Independent board) and Board size
and other controls. Similar to the results reported in Table 5, we find an insignificant coefficient
on EFI, a positive and significant coefficient on R&D, and a positive and significant coefficient on
the interaction variable EFI *D(High R&D). The results again suggest that firm value is positively
associated with the level of employee-friendly practices only in high R&D intensity firms. In
addition, we find that the coefficient on Board size is negative and significant at the 10% level, but
the coefficient on D(Independent board) is insignificant.
These baseline results remain essentially unchanged in model (2) when we add G-index,
which shows a negative and significant coefficient (p-value = 0.005). This negative correlation
between Tobin’s q and G-index suggests that firm value decreases with poor governance quality,
consistent with Gompers et al. (2003) and Masulis et al. (2007). Note that the coefficient on Board
size is no longer significant. In model (3) we replace G-index with E-index, but the results are
almost identical as in model (2). The coefficient of E-index is again negative and significant at the
1% level, confirming the findings in Bebchuk et al. (2009).
[Table 7 about here]
Even after controlling CSR less EFI variable, our results reported in model (4) are almost
identical to those reported in model (3). In particular, the interaction variable EFI*D(High R&D)
is still positive and significant, further supporting the value creation hypothesis, H2.

4.5 Additional Analysis: List of Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For”
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We conduct additional robustness tests using the list of Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to
Work For” as an alternative measure of employee friendliness index. The sample consists of 556
firm-year observations from 1998, the first year of publication, through 2013 after eliminating
private firms, financials, and utilities. The sample is further combined with the KLD Stats
database, excluding the Fortune firms, resulting in 18,310 firm-year observations. Table 8 presents
logit regression results explaining a firm’s inclusion on the Fortune list. The dependent variable
equals one if a firm is included in the list and zero otherwise. In model (1), R&D is positive and
significant at the 1% level, suggesting firms with higher R&D investment are more likely to treat
their workers better and make the Fortune list. This positive association continues to hold even
after controlling for other variables in model (2). The results for the control variables are similar to
the findings in Table 4, except capital expenditure and firm age are now positive and negative,
respectively, and significant at the 1% level. Overall, the evidence on the Fortune list reinforces
our earlier findings that use EFI.
[Table 8 about here]
Event Study: Similar to Chang and Jo (2019), as a robustness check, we conduct an event study
and examine the market’s reaction to a firm’s inclusion on the list of Fortune’s “100 Best
Companies to Work For.” We selected only the first year a firm appears in the Fortune list for our
sample, resulting in 167 observations. This event study also provides a test of reverse causality
between employee-friendly practices and firm value, and presents additional evidence for our
earlier findings from the regression analysis. To the extent that a firm’s first-time inclusion is
largely unanticipated, the analysis of announcement returns at inclusion can explain the causation
that runs from employee-friendly policies to firm performance. We use the standard market model
method described in Brown and Warner (1985) for the event study. The announcement date (day
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0) follows the newswire date that usually precedes the Wall Street Journal publication date.6
Market model parameters are estimated from day -210 to day -11. Two-day abnormal returns are
measured based on the (-1, 0) window. We use the CRSP equally weighted return index as the
market return.
We find that the mean announcement abnormal return is 0.73% and significant at the 5%
level (t-value = 2.19), indicating that investors favorably perceive good employee-friendly
policies. The result is similar to the findings reported in previous research (see, e.g., Faleye &
Trahan, 2011). Next, we present cross-sectional regressions explaining abnormal announcement
returns in Table 9. In model (1), the coefficient of R&D is positive and significant at the 5% level,
suggesting that the market reaction is more positive when firms with higher R&D investment are
selected for the Fortune list. This relationship continues to hold in models (2) and (3), with the
addition of firm size and other control variables. Overall, the event-study results confirm our
earlier findings that good employee-friendly practices lead to an increase in firm value (not the
other way around), especially when R&D investment is high.
[Table 9 about here]

4.6 Robustness Check: Controlling for Patents
Recent studies show that employee-friendly policies are positively correlated with patents
generated (Chang et al., 2015; C. Chen et al., 2016; J. Chen, et al., 2016). Kovacs, Carnabuci, and
Wezel (2021) show that patents that receive more citations tend to have greater economic value
and influence future technological developments. Moreover, they further show that the number of
citations a patent receives depends not only on its inherent technological value, but also on

6

A Factiva search is conducted to identify the announcement date.
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seemingly neutral classification decisions affecting the likelihood that potential future users will
notice it.
Since the patent output is known to be higher in more R&D intensive firms (Scherer, 1965;
Griliches, 1990; C. Chen et al., 2016; J. Chen, et al., 2016), our R&D variable may be merely a
proxy for the patent count in our regressions. To examine this issue, we include a firm’s number of
patents granted as a control variable. The patent data is collected from the NBER Patent Citation
database constructed by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, & Stoffman (2017).7 Accordingly, since the
patent database spans 1926 to 2010, our sample size is reduced to 19,963 firm-year observations.
The results are reported in Table 10. Patents are the total number of patents filed (and eventually
granted) in a given year.8 We use the logarithm of 1 plus Patents in our regressions. Panel (a)
contains the results explaining EFI. In model (1), we find that the coefficient on R&D is positive
and significant after controlling for the patent count, confirming our results in Table 4. The patent
variable Log(1+Patents) is also positive and significant, indicating a positive association between
employee treatment and patents, similarly documented in C. Chen et al. (2016) and J. Chen et al.
(2016). In model (2), we include other control variables used in Table 4, but the results are almost
identical.
[Table 10 about here]
Panel (b) of Table 10 presents the regression results explaining the effect of R&D
expenditures on firm value (Tobin’s q). In each of the four models, we add Log(1+Patents) in
addition to the control variables used in Table 5. Our findings remain intact after controlling for
the patent count. Notably, the interaction variable EFI*D(High R&D) is positive and significant,

The data is obtained from Noah Stoffman’s website: https://iu.app.box.com/patents.
Following other studies, we use patent filing year instead of patent grant year, because the filing year is more
accurate timing of innovation performance (Griliches et al., 1986; C. Chen et al., 2016).
7
8
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while EFI is insignificant in models (3) and (4). The results imply that employee-friendly policies
are positively associated with firm value only in high R&D firms, further supporting the value
creation hypothesis, H2. Log(1+Patents) is positive and significant in all models, suggesting that
patents also increase firm value.

5. CONCLUSION
Based on an extensive sample of U.S. data on firms’ employee-friendly practices and R&D
investment, this paper finds that firms with high R&D intensity engage in employee-friendly
initiatives more than those with low R&D intensity. The evidence implies that R&D investment
encourages firms to treat their employees well, as a high-performing workforce will enhance
corporate innovation (our sustainable innovation hypothesis). We also find that employee
friendliness is positively correlated with firm value, but more for firms with high R&D investment
(our value creation hypothesis).
The latter finding, along with our evidence of a positive correlation between the level of
R&D expenditures and stock price reactions to inclusion on the list of Fortune’s “100 Best
Companies to Work For”, supports a causal argument that runs from employee-friendly policies to
firm performance. Our findings remain robust under different methodologies, including
controlling for corporate governance and an alternative measure of employee-friendly practices.
We believe that our results support the R&D investment-employee-friendly practices and the R&D
investment-firm value nexus. Given that R&D investment is an essential determinant of employeefriendly practices, this finding provides valuable guidance for managers seeking to create value for
their company.
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Our study makes several distinct contributions. Most importantly, our study sheds light on
a puzzling but common observation in the employee relations literature: why is it that in spite of
the large number of academic studies that have linked employee-friendly practices to favorable
firm outcomes, a large number of firms have failed to adopt such practices even as others have?
While Edmans (2011) presents a persuasive explanation of why the management of many
companies do not invest in employee-friendly practices, his explanation does not explain why
some companies do invest in their employees. Our study suggests that at least part of the motive
underlying the adoption of such programs is a motive that has rarely been examined in the
previous literature: managers are influenced by sustainable innovation and entrepreneurial mindset
considerations in their dealings with employees.
Our study also implies that R&D investment is a significant motivator of CSR initiatives,
at least as such initiatives affect the CSR category of employee relations. Therefore, our findings
suggest that investments in employee-friendly policies, at least those that affect this key
stakeholder group, are influenced by innovation and entrepreneurial spirit considerations. Finally,
our study contributes to the innovation literature by identifying R&D investment as an essential
motivator of sustainable employee-friendly policies and the stakeholder theory-based value
creation literature by suggesting that employee-friendly policies benefit R&D-intensive firms.
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Appendix. Variable definitions and data source
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Definition
Data Source
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Dependent Variables
EFI

Employee friendliness index constructed by summing six strengths
and four weaknesses of employee relations categories, where each
category is assigned a 0/1 rating and EFI is the sum of these
ratings, with negative weight for weakness categories

KLD Stats database

Fortune’s 100 Best Companies to Work For

Fortune

Tobin’s q

Market value of equity plus book value of debt, divided by book
value of total assets

Compustat: (Item6 – Item60 + Item199*
Item25)/Item6

R&D

Research and development expenditures divided by total assets

Compustat: Item46/Item6

D(High R&D)

Dummy variable indicating that R&D is greater than sample median Compustat

EFI * D(High R&D)

Interaction variable of EFI times by D(High R&D)

Independent Variables

Compustat

Control Variables
CSR less EFI

Adding strengths and concern factors (negative weight for concerns) KLD Stats database
for each KLD category other than employee relations and then
summing the scores across different CSR categories

Leverage

Long-term debt divided by total assets

Compustat: Item9/Item6

ROA

Return on assets defined as earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets

Compustat: Iem13/Item6

D(Low q)

Dummy variable indicating Tobin’s q less than the sample median

Compustat

HHI

Product market competition: Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
computed using firms’ sales within the two-digit SIC.

Compustat

Capital expenditure

Capital expenditures divided by total assets

Compustat: Item128/Item6

Sales growth

Geometric mean of sales growth over year t-3 to t

Compustat: (Item12t/Item12t-3)1/3 - 1

Return volatility

Standard deviation of daily stock return during the year

Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP)

Firm age

Number of years listed in CRSP,

CRSP

Total assets

Book value of total assets in millions of 2012 dollar

Compustat: Item6

D(Independent board)

Dummy variable indicating that the proportion of outside to total
board members is greater than 50%

RiskMetrics

Board size

Number of board members

RiskMetrics

G-index

GIM: Governance index from Gompers et al. (2003)

RiskMetrics

E-index

BCF: Entrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009)

RiskMetrics
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Table 1. Summary statistics

Mean

Std dev

Q1

Median

Q3

EFI

-0.030

0.950

-1.000

0.000

0.000

R&D

0.044

0.112

0.000

0.005

0.052

Leverage

0.190

0.205

0.011

0.155

0.287

ROA

0.118

0.182

0.082

0.132

0.187

Tobin’s qa

2.146

1.598

1.263

1.667

2.431

HHI

0.069

0.076

0.003

0.042

0.074

Capital expenditure

0.057

0.061

0.020

0.039

0.072

Sales growth (winsorized)

0.121

0.220

0.015

0.086

0.184

Return volatility

0.029

0.015

0.019

0.026

0.035

Firm age

22.21

19.68

8.00

16.00

32.00

Total assets (in millions of 2013 $)
7,348
29,373
476
1,434
4,816
The sample consists of 22,005 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database, spanning 1991 to 2013.
Variables are defined in the Appendix. Sales growth is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All financial
variables are measured at fiscal year-end. aThe number of observations is 21,333 for Tobin’s q because of missing
values in Compustat.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1. EFI

1.000

2. R&D

0.054*** 1.000

3. Leverage

-0.053*** -0.087*** 1.000

4. ROA

0.054*** -0.672*** -0.047*** 1.000

5. Tobin’s q

0.083*** 0.295*** -0.249*** 0.007

6. HHI

-0.070*** -0.155*** 0.032*** 0.092*** -0.051*** 1.000

7. Capital expenditure

0.021*** -0.122*** 0.089*** 0.133*** 0.005

8. Sales growth

0.011

9. Return volatility

-0.041*** 0.234*** 0.006

10. Firm age

0.074*** -0.134*** 0.026*** 0.131*** -0.118*** 0.024*** -0.024*** -0.203*** -0.317*** 1.000

11

1.000

0.029*** 1.000

0.049*** -0.031*** -0.055*** 0.211*** -0.050*** 0.135*** 1.000
-0.306*** 0.093*** -0.054*** -0.063*** 0.066*** 1.000

11. Total assets
0.085*** -0.051*** 0.038*** 0.031*** -0.048*** 0.011
-0.004
-0.033*** -0.130*** 0.274*** 1.000
The sample consists of 22,005 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database, spanning 1991 to 2013. Variables are defined in the Appendix. ** * and **
indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 3. Employee friendliness index (EFI) by R&D investment

R&D > median

R&D ≤ median

Difference
t-statistic
z-statistic
(p-value)
(p-value)
_________________________________________________________________________________________
Mean EFI

0.096

19.81
19.17
(<0.000)
(<0.000)
The sample consists of 22,005 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database, spanning 1991 to 2013. Higher
EFI indicates better employee-friendly practices. R&D expenditures are normalized by total assets. Mean difference is
tested using the t-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon z-test.
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Table 4. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results explaining employee friendliness index (EFI)

Variables

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Intercept

0.106***
(0.000)
0.590***
(0.000)

-0.411***
(0.000)
1.318***
(0.000)
-0.271***
(0.000)
0.611***
(0.000)
-0.870***
(0.000)

-0.425***
(0.000)
1.333***
(0.000)
-0.278***
(0.000)
0.610***
(0.000)
-0.877***
(0.000)
0.243
(0.169)
0.035
(0.339)
0.846
(0.315)
0.010
(0.474)
0.058***
(0.000)

R&D
Leverage
ROA
HHI
Capital expenditure
Sales growth
Return volatility
Log(Firm age)
Log(Total assets)

0.814
(0.330)
0.010
(0.454)
0.058***
(0.000)

Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.121
0.145
0.145
Number of observations
22,005
22,005
22,005
The sample consists of 22,005 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database, spanning 1991 to 2013.
Variables are defined in the Appendix. The p-values based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results explaining firm value (Tobin’s q)

Variables

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

Intercept

3.414***
(0.000)
0.111***
(0.000)

3.126***
(0.000)
0.087***
(0.000)
0.458***
(0.000)

3.155***
(0.000)
0.040
(0.133)
0.461***
(0.000)
0.094***
(0.005)

-1.867***
(0.000)
0.232
(0.554)
-0.319
(0.400)
0.029
(0.928)
1.279***
(0.000)
3.428*
(0.061)
-0.074***
(0.001)
-0.143***
(0.000)

-1.645***
(0.000)
0.395
(0.330)
0.420
(0.250)
0.854***
(0.001)
1.205***
(0.000)
1.998
(0.271)
-0.097***
(0.001)
-0.148***
(0.000)

-1.636***
(0.000)
0.388
(0.338)
0.403
(0.274)
0.862***
(0.007)
1.210***
(0.000)
1.909
(0.292)
-0.098***
(0.000)
-0.151***
(0.000)

3.104***
(0.000)
0.025
(0.272)
0.460***
(0.000)
0.079**
(0.017)
0.040***
(0.000)
-1.614***
(0.000)
0.376
(0.353)
0.420
(0.256)
0.905***
(0.005)
1.211***
(0.000)
2.197
(0.224)
-0.097***
(0.001)
-0.148***
(0.000)

EFI
D(High R&D)
EFI * D(High R&D)
CSR less EFI
Leverage
ROA
HHI
Capital expenditure
Sales growth
Return volatility
Log(Firm age)
Log(Total assets)

Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.157
0.174
0.174
0.177
Number of observations
21,333
21,333
21,333
21,333
The sample consists of 21,333 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database, spanning 1991 to 2013.
Variables are defined in the Appendix. CSR less EFI is corporate social responsibility (CSR) index excluding EFI.
The p-values based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results explaining the employee friendliness index (EFI)—
Controlling for corporate governance
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Intercept
R&D
D(Independent board)
Board size

-0.478**
(0.012)
3.847***
(0.000)
0.102**
(0.012)
-0.960
(0.334)

G-index

-0.506**
(0.021)
3.411***
(0.000)
0.123***
(0.005)
-0.577
(0.604)
-0.012
(0.209)

E-index
Leverage
ROA
HHI
Capital expenditure
Sales growth
Return volatility
Log(Firm age)
Log(Total assets)

-0.390***
(0.001)
0.756***
(0.000)
-0.759***
(0.006)
0.113
(0.740)
-0.037
(0.650)
1.818
(0.258)
-0.001
(0.955)
0.068***
(0.002)

-0.447***
(0.000)
0.817***
(0.001)
-0.770**
(0.014)
0.460
(0.297)
0.024
(0.815)
3.305
(0.127)
0.017
(0.598)
0.054***
(0.004)

-0.584***
(0.006)
3.418***
(0.000)
0.116***
(0.008)
-0.746
(0.513)

-0.008
(0.729)
-0.463***
(0.000)
0.819***
(0.001)
-0.769**
(0.013)
0.482
(0.263)
0.030
(0.767)
3.601*
(0.097)
0.010
(0.755)
0.067***
(0.003)

Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.141
0.129
0.128
Number of observations
11,148
7,013
7,013
___________________________________________________________________________________________
The sample consists of 11,148 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database merged with RiskMetrics,
spanning 1996 to 2013. Note that the “Directors” file that contains director information only goes back to 1996 and
the “Legacy” file that contains G-index and E-index information goes back to 1990 but stops in 2006. Accordingly,
the sample size is reduced to 11,148 firm-year observations to include board characteristics and further reduced to
7,013 to include governance index variables. Variables are defined in the Appendix. The p-values based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 7. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results explaining firm value (Tobin’s q)—Controlling for corporate
governance
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
Model (4)
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Intercept
EFI
D(High R&D)
EFI * D(High R&D)
D(Independent board)
Board size

0.809***
(0.000)
0.001
(0.950)
0.419***
(0.000)
0.099***
(0.005)
-0.044
(0.473)
-1.991*
(0.068)

G-index

0.424*
(0.090)
-0.020
(0.506)
0.449***
(0.000)
0.118**
(0.023)
0.003
(0.967)
-1.814
(0.183)
-0.031***
(0.005)

E-index

0.336
(0.180)
-0.014
(0.647)
0.444***
(0.000)
0.110**
(0.034)
-0.002
(0.977)
-1.896
(0.151)

-0.069***
(0.004)

CSR less EFI
Leverage
ROA
HHI
Capital expenditure
Sales growth
Return volatility
Log(Firm age)
Log(Total assets)

Year fixed effects
Adjusted R2
Number of observations

0.381
(0.127)
-0.024
(0.423)
0.442***
(0.000)
0.105**
(0.043)
-0.001
(0.993)
-2.129
(0.119)
-0.031***
(0.005)

-1.609***
(0.000)
7.178***
(0.000)
-0.213
(0.473)
-1.837***
(0.000)
1.144***
(0.000)
16.021***
(0.000)
-0.094***
(0.000)
0.045**
(0.036)

-1.813***
(0.000)
8.755***
(0.000)
-0.493
(0.262)
-2.570***
(0.000)
1.266***
(0.000)
20.364***
(0.000)
-0.086**
(0.016)
0.085***
(0.002)

-1.831***
(0.000)
8.719***
(0.000)
-0.529
(0.227)
-2.454***
(0.000)
1.265***
(0.000)
20.583***
(0.000)
-0.107***
(0.002)
0.083***
(0.003)

0.030***
(0.008)
-1.794***
(0.000)
8.705***
(0.000)
-0.461
(0.288)
-2.549***
(0.000)
1.301***
(0.000)
20.468***
(0.000)
-0.081**
(0.024)
0.091***
(0.001)

Yes
0.372
10,990

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.393
0.393
0.395
6,913
6,913
6,913
The sample consists of 10,990 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database merged with RiskMetrics, spanning
1996 to 2013. Note that the “Directors” file that contains director information only goes back to 1996 and the “Legacy” file that
contains G-index and E-index information goes back 1990 but stops in 2006. Accordingly, the sample size is reduced to 10,990
firm-year observations to include board characteristics and further reduced to 6,913 to include governance index variables.
Variables are defined in the Appendix. CSR less EFI is corporate social responsibility (CSR) index excluding EFI. The

p-values based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8. Logit regression results explaining inclusion in the list of Fortune’s 100 best companies to work for

Variables

Model (1)

Model (2)

Intercept

-8.107***
(0.000)
2.930***
(0.007)

-8.581***
(0.000)
6.455***
(0.000)
-3.479***
(0.000)
5.165***
(0.000)
-1.002*
(0.069)
2.237***
(0.005)
-0.043
(0.892)
-4.734
(0.584)
-0.319***
(0.000)
0.685***
(0.000)

R&D
Leverage
ROA
HHI
Capital expenditure
Sales growth
Return volatility
Log(Firm age)
Log(Total assets)

0.560***
(0.000)

Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Pseudo R2
0.101
0.185
Number of observations
18,310
18,310
The dependent variable equals one if a firm is included in the list of Fortune’s 100 Best Companies to Work For,
and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 556 firm-year observations from 1998 through 2013, excluding private
firms, financials, and utilities. The sample is further combined with the KLD Stats database, excluding the Fortune
firms, resulting in 18,310 firm-year observations. Variables are defined in the Appendix. The p-values based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. * and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results explaining abnormal stock returns (−1, 0) around
announcements of Fortune’s 100 Best Companies to Work For
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Variables
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Intercept
R&D

0.001
(0.931)
0.142**
(0.029)

0.014
(0.457)
0.140**
(0.035)

Leverage
ROA
HHI
Capital expenditure
Sales growth
Return volatility
Log(Firm age)
Log(Total assets)

-0.002
(0.426)

0.003
(0.915)
0.153**
(0.032)
-0.004
(0.789)
-0.019
(0.531)
-0.072
(0.127)
0.056
(0.423)
0.012
(0.366)
0.462
(0.223)
0.002
(0.527)
-0.002
(0.406)

Adjusted R2
0.039
0.038
0.085
Number of observations
167
167
152
The announcement date (day 0) is the day following the newswire date of announcing the firm’s inclusion in the list
of Fortune’s 100 Best Companies to Work For. The announcement-period returns are measured from day -1
through day 0. The sample period is from 1998 through 2013. Only the first appearance on the list is included in the
sample, resulting in 167 observations. Variables are defined in the Appendix. The p-values based on
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** indicates statistical significance at the
5% level.
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Table 10. Robustness check: Controlling for patents
Panel (a): Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of employee-friendly policy index (EFI) on R&D investment

Variables

Model (1)

Model (2)

Intercept

-0.032
(0.352)
0.414***
(0.000)
0.082***
(0.000)

-0.098
(0.427)
0.945***
(0.000)
0.071***
(0.000)

No
Yes
0.101
19,963

Yes
Yes
0.113
19,963

R&D
Log(1+Patents)

Other control variables in Table 4
Year FE
Adjusted R2
N

Panel (b): Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of firm value (Tobin’s q) on employee-friendly policy index (EFI)
and R&D investment

Variables

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Model (4)

Intercept

3.421***
(0.000)
0.086***
(0.000)

3.076***
(0.000)
0.075***
(0.000)
0.349***
(0.000)

3.101***
(0.000)
0.027
(0.260)
0.360***
(0.000)
0.098**
(0.023)

0.148***
(0.000)

0.086***
(0.000)

0.083***
(0.000)

3.036***
(0.000)
0.019
(0.414)
0.355***
(0.000)
0.085**
(0.049)
0.036***
(0.000)
0.083***
(0.000)

EFI
D(High R&D)
EFI * D(High R&D)
CSR less EFI
Log(1+Patents)

Other control variables in Table 5
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.178
0.184
0.185
0.187
N
19,353
19,353
19,353
19,353
In Panel (a), the sample consists of 19,963 firm-year observations from the KLD Stats database, spanning 1991 to
2010. The sample is reduced to 19,353 firm-year observations in Panel (b). Variables are defined in Appendix.
Patents are the number of patents. CSR less EFI is corporate social responsibility (CSR) index excluding EFI. The
p-values based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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